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JOINT TENANCY: SOME THOUGHTS ON
CREDITOR'S RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
It appears that the popularity of the joint tenancy, especially
between husband and wife, for the ownership of real property
persists.' Notwithstanding the tax advantages,2 many persons
apparently feel that the advantages of survivorship which the joint
tenancy provides makes it a useful estate. They see the joint ten-
ancy as a "poor man's will" and thus as a means to transfer
property at death without the necessity of a will or the expense
and inconvenience of probate.8 One individual, however, who may
not feel so 'well disposed nor so happily view these apparent ad-
vantages is the creditor of a deceased joint tenant.
The State Bar Association of North Dakota was contemplating
proposing to the State Legislature an enactment having as its pur-
pose protection of the rights of creditors of a deceased joint tenant.'
The committee' that studied the proposal considered two pos-
sibilities. One would have been to impose liability for indebtedness
of the deceased joint tenant upon the surviving joint tenant. The
alternative was to cast such indebtedness as a lien or charge
upon the property interest of the deceased joint tenant. A tentative
indication favored making the indebtedness a lien or charge upon
the property rather than a personal obligation on the surviving
joint tenant.
Subsequent to considering the proposal the committee deter-
mined that no recommendation for change would be submitted.6
The reasoning being that creditors have methods by which they
are able to protect themselves from such contingencies and that
the common law conception of joint tenancy should be preserved.
1. Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancies: Law, Fact, and Fancy, 51 IOWA L. REv. 582,
623 (1965).
2. For discussion ot tax problems see Worthy, Problems of Jointly Owned Property,
22 THE TAX LAWYER 601 (No. 3 1969); Mann, Joint Tenancies Today, UNIV. ILL. L. F.
48, 59-63 (1956).
3. Mann, Joint Tenancies Today, UNIV. ILL. L. F. 48, 48-50 (1956).
4. Report of the Title Standards Committee, 46 N.D.L. REV. 152 (1969).
5. Title Standards Committee.
6. Telephone conversation with Clinton Ottmar, Attorney from Jamestown and com-
mittee member, on October 7, 1970.
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The purpose of this note is to present and analyze some of
the problems that may arise between creditors and deceased (and
surviving) joint tenants; their solution today, and recommendations
for the future.
HISTORY
A joint tenancy exists when the four unities, as espoused by
Blackstone, exist:
the unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity of
time and the unity of possession; or in other words, joint
tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one
and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same
time, and held by one and the same undivided possession.
7
Joint tenancies, which have existed at least as early as Bracton's
time, were favored at common law." This favored position is
thought to have stemmed from the desire on the part of the feudal
lords to avoid separating the collection of incidents of tenure.9
In 1304, in order to protect the rights of feudal lords, the right
of survivorship was held to be terminated by partition. 10 This
"plugged the hole" whereby cotenants would mutuallly effect a
partition and then remain on the land. By holding that a partition
did terminate the right of survivorship that portion held by the
deceased tenant would escheat to the chief lord rather than "survive"
to the remaining tenant. Further protection for the lord was af-
forded by the rule that the widow of a deceased joint tenant
did not have dower rights."
With the political abolition of tenures the reason no longer
existed for favoring joint tenancies; therefore courts of equity com-
menced construing conveyances as tenancies in common in the
absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary. In America,
this construction favoring a tenancy in common has been followed.' 2
The theory behind such a favoring is that ultimate ownership of
property should not depend upon an accident of survivorship."1
Further in-roads against the original concept of joint tenancy
can be illustrated. At common law a grantor was not allowed
to convey to himself and another as joint tenants.14 This has been
7. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 180 (1897).
8. W. WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW at 211 (2d ed. 1932). 3 W. HoLDs-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3rd ed. 1923).
9. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 217 (1962).
10. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 127 (3rd ed. 1923).
11. Ducan v. Forrer, 6 Binuey 192 (Pa. 1813). C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 219 (1962).
12. Noble v. Teeple, 58 Kan. 398, 49 P. 598 (1897).
13. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 217-18 (1962).
14. Id. at 219.
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abrogated by statute in some American jurisdictions." It would
appear that permitting such a conveyance is a substitute for a
devise by will. In 1539 a writ of partition was made available as
a remedy whereby an aggrieved joint tenant could compel a par-
tition of land held in joint tenancy.
6
The question of whether or not a mortgage executed by one
joint tenant severs the tenancy was faced in 1709.17 At common
ilaw a mortgage constituted a conveyance, so the court stated,
therefore, a mortgage executed by one of three joint tenants severed
the joint tenancy.1 8 The reasoning offered was that it would work
as a disadvantage to the mortgagor if the joint tenancy continued
because if the mortgagee happened to die before his cotenants,
all of his estate and interest would go from his representative to
the survivor(s). This holding protected the creditor, however, sub-
sequent cases1 9 in the United States appear to protect the surviving
joint tenant although a minority of the jurisdictions20 have opted
in favor of the creditor of a deceased joint tenant.
In property theory a survivor's share (of joint tenancy) is
not subject to death taxes because no estate passes at death but
is the survivor's from inception. 2' However, such a tax savings
device was long ago nullified.
22
JOINT TENANCIES-SEVERANCE AND ENCUMBRANCE
The main advantage of a joint tenancy would appear to be
its right of survivorship feature. What actions joint tenants may
take which constitute encumbrances that will sever the unities and
thereby dissolve the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 2 With regard to mortgages, much
depends upon whether the jurisdiction is a title or lien state. From
dicta (mortgages were not in issue) in Hammond v. McArthur it
was stated that:
In jurisdictions where a mortgage ordinarily operates to
transfer the legal title, a mortgage by a joint tenant causes
a severance of the joint tenancy . . . Also, in some states
where a mortgage is regarded as mere security, a mortgage
by a joint tenant brings the tenancy to an end. However,
that conclusion is not in accord with the common-law author-
ities to the effect that the creation by a joint tenant of a
15. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-23 (1960).
16. W. WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 211 (2d ed. 1932).
17. Id. at 213. York v. Stone, 1 Salk 158, 91 Eng. Reprint 146 (1709).
18. Id.
19. See People v. Nogarr, 164 Cal. App.2d 591, 330 P.2d 858, 860 (1958).
20. See S.D. COMP. LAWS Ch. 30-21A-1 (Supp. 1970).
21. J. CRIBBETT, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 97 (1962).
22. See United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1939).
23. See generally Swenson and Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38 MINN. L.
Rgv. 466-505 (1953).
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mere charge upon the land is a nullity as against the right
of survivorship of the other joint tenant . . .2
As to liens, leases, easements and other encumbrances, it
appears that the results also vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
depending upon the statutes involved and case law interpretation.
2 5
In the discussion below regarding mortgages we are emphasizing
those cases which arose in the lien theory jurisdictions because
North Dakota is such a jurisdiction.2 6 As to our examples of other
encumbrances which have been held not to constitute a severance,
we have pointed out those cases in which we feel an unjust decision
was reached. By this material, which is not meant to be inclusive
of all possible encumbrances, we hope to support the contention
that North Dakota needs legislation in this area.
As previously stated, at common law a mortgage acted as a
conveyance thereby changing a joint tenancy into a tenancy in
common if executed by one of the tenants. However, the general
rule today appears to be that a mortgage upon realty executed by
one of two joint tenants albeit without the knowledge or consent
of the other is merely a lien or charge on such joint tenants' inter-
est and terminates upon his death, therefore a cause of action
by the mortgagee does not survive the mortgagor's death. 27
In People v. Nogarr28 the husband and wife held property as
joint tenants. Subsequently they separated, after which the husband
executed a mortgage on the property without the knowledge or
consent of the wife. The husband then died prior to condemnation
proceedings. The court held that the condemnation moneys went
to the wife and not the mortgagee. The rule was stated that a
mortgage (upon real property) executed by one of two joint tenants
is not enforceable after the death of that joint tenant. The execution
of a mortgage does not operate to terminate joint tenancy but
is merely a charge or a lien upon interest as a joint tenant only.
Therefore, death terminates the interest of the deceased joint tenant
and, of course, it follows that the mortgage is thereby terminated.
The wife then held the property as exclusive owner and the land
was free from any mortgage, lien or otherwise against it.
In California a mortgage is a hypothecation of property mort-
gaged.29 This means that a mortgage is merely a charge or lien
without the necessity of change in possession and no right of pos-
session is in the mortgagee. According to the California Civil Code,
§ 2920, a mortgage does not pass legal title to a mortgagee; there-
24. 30 Cal.2d 512, 515, 183 P.2d 1, 3 (1947).
25. See Mann, aupra note 3, at 65-73; Swenson and Degnan, supra note 23, at 466-488.
26. See N.D .CENT. CODE §§ 35-03-01.1, 35-03-01.2 (Supp. 1969).
27. 8ee 67 A.L.R.2d 992 Anno. at 999.
28. People v. Nogarr, 164 Cal. App.2d 591, 330 P.2d 858 (1958).
29. Id. at 860.
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fore none of the unities were destroyed. The husband's interest
ceased at his death, therefore the lien of mortgage expired with
the husband. It is interesting to note in this case the court's reason-
ing that the note was payable on demand and therefore the mort-
gagee could have enforced the lien and mortgage by a foreclosure
prior to the death of the mortgagor and thus severed the joint
tenancy. The fact that he chose to await the contingency of which
joint tenant died first was done at his (mortgagee's) peril. If the
mortgagor had survived, the security of the mortgagee's lien would
have been doubled. The court felt that this was unjust because
one joint tenant could execute a mortgage and receive the value
of his undivided one-half interest while still retaining the right to
the entire property if he should survive the other joint tenant.
Whereas, if the other joint tenant were to survive the mortgagor,
then he would take only his undivided one-half interest because the
mortgagor's undivided one-half interest would go to the mortgagee
by default.
A recent case in Florida"° involved the deceased and grantee
becoming joint tenants by a conveyance from the deceased as
grantor. Subsequent to the recording of the deed the deceased ex-
ecuted a mortgage on the property without the knowledge of the
grantee joint tenant. The mortgagee filed suit to foreclose the mort-
gage prior to the mortgagor's demise. The question for the court
was whether or not the lien of the mortgage executed by the de-
ceased was enforceable, after said deceased's death, against the
undivided one-half interest in the property held by the deceased
prior to her death. The court answered in the negative, notwith-
standing the fact that the mortgagee had filed suit to foreclose the
mortgage some five months prior to the demise of the mortgagor-
joint tenant.
In Nebraska the giving of a mortgage by one cotenant acts
to sever the unity of interests and such joint tenancy then becomes
a tenancy in common. However, tenants in common are not bound
by the unauthorized acts of their cotenant. The case in point
involves the purchase of an automobile by husband and wife with
full rights of survivorship.3 1 Subsequently a chattel mortgage on
the car was taken but signed by the husband only. The money
which was borrowed by the husband from the plaintiff was then
deposited in a bank on which the wife also had a right to draw
checks. The issue presented was could a mortgagee of one cotenant
maintain an action in replevin against the other undivided one-half
interest holder of a single article by its nature not subject to
division between the co-owners? The court held in the negative.
30. D.A.D., Inc. v. Moring, 218 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1969).
31. First National Bank in Ord v. Morgan, 172 Neb. 849, 112 N.W.2d 26 (1961).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The reason being that the wife did not mislead the plaintiff. It was
not shown that the wife ever actually drew checks on the said
bank account. Also, it was not proven that the wife knew of the
mortgage at the time it was executed.
California 32 and Wisconsin3 3 hold that a judgment lien does
not sever a joint tenancy but merely gives the holder a right to
levy on the interest. If the joint tenant debtor dies prior to the
levy having been executed the surviving joint tenant will take free
of such liens. The indication is that a creditor holding a judgment
lien against a joint tenant will not be permitted to gamble that
his debtor will survive the other joint tenant(s) and therefore pos-
sess greater security because of the survivorship feature. The fol-
lowing quotation summarizes the point:
When a creditor has a judgment lien against the interest
of one joint tenant he can immediately execute and sell the
interest of his judgment debtor, and thus sever the joint
tenancy, or he can keep his lien alive and wait until the
joint tenancy is terminated by the death of one of the joint
tenants. If the judgment debtor survives, the judgment lien
immediately attaches to the entire property. If the judgment
debtor is the first to die, the lien is lost. If the creditor sits
back to await this contingency . . . he assumes the risk of
losing his lien.34
A common attitude in the judicial community is illustrated by
a Nebraska case 35 involving a conveyance by the grantor to herself
and her sister as joint tenants. Debts were incurred by one of the
sisters and after her death her creditors brought an action against
the property previously held in joint tenancy because the deceased's
estate did not possess sufficient amount to meet the obligations.
The court, in holding for the surviving joint tenant, stated that
the mere incurring of debts by one of two joint tenants does
not effect a severance. It was stated that joint tenancies are not
favored but can be created by contract. 6 If a joint tenant divests
himself of the estate the severance creates a tenancy in Icommon
which is subject to the debts of the deceased co-owner. The opinion
leaves any needed adjustments to the legislature:
If there is to be any further or additional relief for credi-
tors from the legal effect of joint tenancies by those dealing
with persons who hold their property in joint tenancy with
right of survivorship than what has already been enacted
32. Anderson v. Southern Pac. Co., 70 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1968).
*33. Musa v. Segelke & Kohlhaus Co., 224 Wis. 432, 272 N.W. 657 (1937).
34. ZeIgler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App.2d 217, 219, 126 P.2d 118, 120-21 (1942).
35. De Forge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 76 N.W.2d 733 (1956).
36. 76 N.W.2d at 736.
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by the Legislature we think it should come from the same
source.3'
The question arises: at what point in the judgment pro-
ceeding is a joint tenancy severed? A perusal of some cases in
Illinois offer an interesting answer. In 1927 the Supreme Court
of Illinois38 held that the entry of a judgment against one joint
tenant does not effect a severance. This was followed by a case
where judgment was entered against a debtor joint tenant followed
by execution and levy.39 Subsequent to this the debtor died and.
predictably the same court held that a severance had not occured,
therefore the surviving joint tenant's interest was held by him
free from any encumbrances. The climax to this excerpt is where
a joint tenant debtor suffered judgment and execution sale prior
to his demise; the court held that the joint tenancy had not been
severed because the sheriff's deed had not as yet issued.40 There-
fore, the surviving joint tenant held the property free from the
judgment creditor. This jurisdiction has held that a severance is
effected when judgment has been entered followed by a levy, execu-
tion sale, and sheriff's deed transfering the judgment debtor's in-
terest at the conclusion of the redemption period. 41
There is a split of authority on whether a contract of sale made
by both or all joint tenants will operate as a severance.42 At least
two states' 3 in the Eighth Circuit have held that a severance would
result from a contract for sale. However, since it appears that
the North Dakota Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to
rule on this issue, it would be sheer speculation to try to second
guess what their decision would be. Should they hold that it would
not sever the tenancy, there is always the possibility that, after
the contract of sale is entered into but before executed, one or
more of the joint tenants could die. Without severance, the sur-
viving joint tenant (s) would acquire possession of the joint tenancy
and therefore the right to the payment price agreed upon under
the contract of sale. As the deceased tenant's estate would get
nothing from the joint tenancy, his creditor in turn, who may
37. 76 N.W.2d at 738.
38. Peoples Trust and Savings Bank v. Haas, 328 Ill. 468, 160 N.E. 85 (1927).
39. Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 1i1. 449, 61 N.E.2d 358 (1945).
40. Jackson v. Lacey, 408 Ill. 530, 97 N.E.2d 839, 840 (1951).
41. Johnson v. Muntz, 364 Ill. 482, 4 N.E.2d 826, 830 (1936). See also, Mann, Joint
Tenancies Today, TiNIV. OF ILL. LAW FORUM 48, 71-72 (1956).
43. See In Be Baker's Estate, 247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863 (1956) ; Buford v. Dahlke,
23, at 469-485. For case annotations see 4 G. THoMPsoN, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY
§ 1780 at 7-11 (Supp. 1970).
43. See In Re Baker's Estate, 247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863 (1956) ; Buford v. Dahlke,
158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252 (1954). In both these cases the joint tenants as vendors had
retained legal title. In both of these cases when the husband died his estate received
one-half of the subsequent payments of the purchase price. For contra on almost idnti-
cal factual situation see Hewitt v. Biege, 183 Kan. 352, 327 P.2d 872 (1958).
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have had a lien on the joint tenancy property, would be left out
in the cold.
The effect upon a joint tenancy of a lease, is another question
the North Dakota Supreme Court has apparently not passed upon.
"The English view was that where joint tenants in fee all joined
in a lease for years or for some lesser term, reserving rent jointly,




However, a more difficult problem arises where less than all
the joint tenants execute a lease. It has been pointed out that:
Even the English view here appears to have been uncer-
tain. It seems to have been agreed by the English authorities
that where one of two joint tenants in fee made a lease
for years of his share, that lease would (so far as the lessor's
share was concerned) be binding upon the other joint tenant
in case of the death of the lessor. But it was not clear
whether the lease suspended the joint tenancy so as to de-
stroy the right of survivorship during the term.
46
There is a scarcity of case law on this issue. However, two California
cases4 7 indicate that a lease by less than all joint tenants would
not effect a complete severance of the tenancy.
Tiffaney has stated that:
If one of two joint tenants in fee simple makes a lease
for years for his share, the lease is no doubt binding upon
the other joint tenant in case of the death of the lessor, but
whether it effects a severance, as does the conveyance of
a life estate . . . does not clearly appear. . . . that, if one
of two joint tenants for years makes a lease for a less term
of years, there is a complete severance so long as the lease
endures, defeating the right of survivorship in case of death.
• . .48 (Emphasis added)
In the Illinois case of Tindall v. Yeats 49 there is dicta to
the effect that at least where the joint tenants agreed by contract
to allow one of the joint tenants to rent and lease out the joint
tenancy and retain the rents and profits, no severance would occur.
It appears inconsistent with the theory of joint tenancy owner-
ship "per my et per tout" 0 to hold that one joint tenant could
lease the land without the consent or with the non-acquiescence
44. Mann, supra note 3, at 68-69 citing Palmer v. Rich, [1897] 1 ch. 134, 142 (1896).
45. See Gillette v. Nicolls, 121 Cal. App.2d 185, 262 P.2d 856 (1953).
46. Mann, siipra note 3, at 69, citing 2 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 425 (3rd ed.
1939).
47. See Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 54 P.2d 73 (1936) ; and Hammond v. McArthur, 30
Cal.2d 512, 183 P.2d 1, (1947).
48. 2 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 425 at 210 (3rd ed. 1939).
49. Tindall v. Yeats, 392 I1. 502, 64 N.E.2d 903 (1946).
50. See BLACK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 1293 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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of the other joint tenant (s) without effecting a severance. A recent
Minnesota case-' may have opened the door for a solution to
.the non-acquiescent joint tenant by upholding a Unilateral Declara-
tion of Election to Sever Survivorship of joint tenancy thus creating
a tenancy in common. The Minnesota court points out that this
is merely eliminating the common law conveyance to a strawman
which would accomplish the same purpose.
The extent to which a lease would be held to effect creditor's
rights would depend upon whether or not such lease would con-
stitute a severance. If a severance would occur, it is possible that
a creditor, who had a lien proportional to the total value of the
joint tenancy property, would lose his advantage with a severance.
The effect of the murder of one joint tenant by the other
upon the latter's rights as survivor has led to diversity of opinion.52
The Colorado court has held" that where the husband and wife
owned property in joint tenancy and the husband killed both his
wife and adopted daughter and later committed suicide, the joint
tenancy property went to his estate.
Under a similar set of circumstances, the Wisconsin Court held"
that when the wife died:
her status as joint tenant continued in her administrator
[personal property] and heirs-at-law [real property];
and when her husband died and his life interest in the prop-
erty ended, her joint tenancy became her estate of inheri-
tance in the entire property.5
Courts holding this way appear to do so under a constructive
trust theory. Under this theory, legal title passes to the murderer
but equity will treat him as a constructive trustee because of
his unconscionable acquisition of the property. He will then be com-
pelled to convey it to whomever it has been devised or bequeathed
by his victim. In the absence of a will the property will pass to
the victim's heirs or next of kin exclusive of the murderer.56
There have, however, been recent decisions to the effect that
in the case where death of the joint tenants is declared to be
simultaneous57 (even though there was evidence that the husband
had killed his wife and then committee suicide) and where it
has been determined that the husband was insane before killing
51. Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Federal Sav. & L. Ass'n., 281 Minn. 462, 161 N.W.2d
688 (1968).
52. See generally 32 A.L.R.2d 1107, 1108 (1953).
53. Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Col. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950).
54. Re King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d 885 (1952).
55. 52 N.W.2d at 889.
56. See Neiman v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55, 93 A.2d 345, 347 (1952).
57. See Matter of Bobula, 19 N.Y.2d 818, 280 N.Y.S.2d 152, 227 N.E.2d 49 (1967).
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his wife; ,' each of the estates share equally in the joint tenancy
property.
Several jurisdictions have held that one who murders his joint
tenant is entitled to nothing and sacrifices his prior interest in the
joint tenancy.
59
The extent to which a jurisdiction holds that murder will sever a
joint tenancy could have an effect upon the creditor's rights. Although
it does seem fair that one should not be enriched by his own wrong-
doing, it may not necessarily follow that his creditors should lose
their rights to liens on the same property.
North Dakota follows the common law in its treatment of joint
tenancies in several aspects. Hagen v. Schluchtere° involved a hus-
band and his wife, who held their real and personal property as joint
tenants, executing separate mutual wills which provided for dis-
position of their property inconsistent with the concept of joint ten-
ancy. The husband died after which his widow executed a contract
for deed containing an agreement to sell the land previously held by
them as joint tenants. The court in holding that the deceased's will
was ineffective, thereby preserving the widow's right to the property
stated:
The joint tenant who survives does not take the moiety of
the other tenant from him or as his successor, but takes it by
right under the conveyance or instrument by which the joint
tenancy was created.0 '
Co-owned savings bonds, which were payable to either party with-
out the signature of the other, were held to vest with the survivor
upon the death of the co-owner. The vesting of title in the survivor
was not taking by moiety but by right under the conveyance creat-
ing the joint tenancy. The effect of this holding was to deprive de-
cedent's estate of the bonds notwithstanding the fact that a will had
been executed. 62 Seaborn v. Kaiser6 protected the survivor's inter-
est in a joint bank account which resulted in defeating the deceased's
sister's claim to his estate regarding said account.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that a joint tenancy
is not destroyed because of an oral agreement, among the joint own-
ers, which provided the deceased tenant with income from the prop-
58. See In Re Estate of Lupka, 56 Mlsc.2d 677, 289 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1968).
59. See Spicer v. New York L. Ins. Co., 268 F. 500 (5th Cir. 1920); Merrity v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co., 110 N.J.L. 414, 166 A. 335 (1933); Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div.
87, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (1935).
60. Hagen v. Schluchter, 126 N.W.2d 899 (N.D. 1964).
61. Id. at 901.
62. In Re Kasparls' Estate, 71 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1955). See also In Re Berzel's Es-
tate, 101 N.W.2d 557 (N.D. 1960).
63. Seaborn v. Kaiser, 117 N.W.2d 863 (N.D. 1962).
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erty while he lived.64 North Dakota has made it clear that one joint
tenant may not convey the interest of his cotenant without written
authority from such tenant.6 5 Just as clear is the permission granted
a joint tenant to transfer his own interest. In the subject case"8 a
husband and wife owned land as joint tenants and the husband, by
oral agreement, permitted a builder to encroach upon the property.
The court stated that this agreement, in addition to a statute of
frauds issue, was not binding upon the wife. An estoppel theory pre-
vented the wife from being successful in an action against the
builder because the wife had waited for a period of eleven years
before asserting her rights.
A North Dakota case 7 involved two brothers as defendants, one
of whom executed an oral contract with the plaintiff. The plaintiff
was to furnish defendant with labor and materials for repairs to a
potato warehouse on property belonging to the defendants. The de-
fendant who did the contracting with the plaintiff was to repay the
plaintiff a certain amount of money which he failed to do. Plaintiff
then filed a mechanic's lien on the property. Judgment by default
was entered but then it was discovered the property had been dis-
posed of by the defendants prior to the filing of the plaintiff's lien.
The judgment was amended to personal judgments against the de-
fendants and the defendants appealed. The court held that one de-
fendant was not liable because he had no knowledge that his "coten-
ant" had contracted with the plaintiff to improve the property. It was
not shown that a partnership or an agency existed between the de-
fendants. The nature of the interest in the property by the defendants
was not alleged. This is unfortunate because if the brothers had been
found to hold the property as joint tenants the court could have been
faced with the situation of a "wronged" creditor against an "inno-
cent" cotenant. If one cared to hypothetically extend the facts, the
amount of the mechanics lien could have exceeded the value of the
debtor's interest in the property and if the debtor died insolvent prior
to the lien holder being satisfied, the situation would be presented
four-square of whether the creditor has performed his contractual
duties for nothing thereby unjustly enriching the surviving tenant.
Dicta in the case suggested that tenants in common and joint
tenants can deal with strangers as freely as owners of property held
individually, but one such co-tenant cannot, as a general rule, bind his
cotenant for his interest in the property by his sole contract.
64. State Tax Conum'r. v. Tuchscherer, 130 N.W.2d 608 (N.D. 1964). See also N.D.
CENT. CODE § 57-37-06 (Supp. 1969).
65. Brandhagen v. Burt, 117 N.W.2d 696 (N.D. 1962).
66. Id.
67. Adamsen Conast. Co. V. Altendorf, 152 N.W.2d 576 (N.D. 1967).
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As has been pointed out by this note, the rights and subsequent
remedies of a creditor of a deceased joint tenant depend upon each
jurisdiction's acceptance or modification of the common law doctrine
of joint tenancy.
There has been a growing attitude over the years which leads to
a presumption in favor of tenancies in common. 6 However, as
Powell has pointed out, if this is merely a judicial attitude and the
language is so specific as to leave no doubt that a joint tenancy has
been created, courts will usually so hold. 69 In jurisdictions where
this presumption is favored by statute which has abolished either the
joint tenancy estate or eliminated the survivorship aspect,70 the lan-
guage has been construed to create a tenancy in common for life
with a contingent remainder in fee in favor of the survivor.
7 1
Powel 7 2 states that this differs from a joint tenancy in that:
1) The right of survivorship in one tenant is not destructible by
the act of the other tenant.
73
2) The creditors of one tenant have less which they can reach
for the payment of their claims.
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3) The estate created is not subject to partition.
7 5
North Dakota has in essence adopted by statute the common
law.76 This implies that without severance a surviving joint tenant (s)
will take the property free and clear of any claims of the deceased
joint tenant's creditors. This suggests a disadvantage to creditors.
The lack of case law in North Dakota as to what constitutes sev-
erance of a joint tenancy and what effect this has on a creditor's
rights in regard to the debts of a deceased joint tenant allows sev-
eral assumptions:
1) The problems have not arisen; or
2) The problems, if arisen, have not been adjudicated; or
3) If adjudicated, an appeal has not been successfully carried to
the North Dakota Supreme Court.
However, regardless of which of the above assumptions is most ac-
curate, the question remains as to whether North Dakota should make
legislative changes in an attempt to minimize potential problems.
68. 4 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 616 at 664-65 (1970).
69. Id. at 666, 667.
70. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-107 (1955) ; GEN. STAT. N.C. § 41-2 (Supp. 1966)
CODE OF VR. 1950 § 55-20 (Supp. 1969); CODE OF S.C. § 19-55 (1962).
71. 4 R. POWELL, supra note 68, at 668.
72. Id. at 669.
73. Papke v. Pearson, 203 Minn. 130, 280 N.W. 183 (1938).
74. King v. King, 107 Cal. App.2d 257, 236 P.2d 912 (1951).
75. Johnson v. Woodard, 356 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. 1962).
76. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-06 (1960).
NoTEs
It is suggested that perhaps the most equitable solution would be
one which would allow an estate of joint tenancy with its advantages
of the right of survivorship while at the same time afford creditors
certain protection. A few states have attempted to accomplish this
by legislative enactments.7 7 A main thrust of this legislation is that
encumbrances not amounting to a severance placed upon a joint ten-
ancy by less than all joint tenants shall continue to encumber the
interest accruing to the surviving joint tenant (s).
However, the extent to which the surviving joint tenant is held
liable varies from state to state. The statutes of Connecticut'78 for
example, appear to hold the surviving joint tenants liable for the
entire encumbrance; whereas the South Dakota statute 79 declares
that "[t]he surviving joint owner shall be liable . . . only to an
amount equal to the value of the amount contributed to the jointly
owned property by the deceased joint owner determined at the time
of his death. . .. "so
Since joint tenants place encumbrances upon the joint tenancy
without the knowledge, consent or approval of the other joint ten-
ant (s), it would be unfair to hold an "innocent" surviving joint tenant
liable up to 100 per cent of the value of the joint tenancy as
Connecticut appears to do. On the other hand, although South Dakota
may have a better idea in trying to limit the liability, they may
have some trouble in evaluating the value of the amount contributed.
For instance, if a husband and wife purchase property in joint ten-
ancy, it may be difficult in many instances to determine what would
be the value of the wife's contribution.
A solution would be to draft a statute such that at the death of a
joint tenant, who had encumbered the property in question without
the consent of the other joint tenant (s), the value of the contributions
would be determined as a matter of law. One means would be to es-
tablish the value, as of the date of the joint tenant's death, propor-
tional to the total number of joint tenants. The survivors would take
the property in question by survivorship encumbered, however, by a
liability equal to the determined value of contribution of the de-
deceased joint tenant. Thus, for example; A, B and C own property
in joint tenancy, and C obtains a loan by a lien on the joint tenancy
without the knowledge of A and B; and then C dies. A and B will take
the property in question by survivorship subject to an encumbrance
of up to 1/3 of the value of the property in question (as there were
three joint tenants, C's value would be 1/3 of the value of the joint
tenancy regardless of C's actual contribution).
77. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-14A to -14K (1960); S.D. CoMp. LAWS *j
30-21A-1 to -6 (Supp. 1970); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 230.45-.48 (West 1957).
78. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-14A to -14K (1960).
79. See S.D. Comp. LAWS § 30-21A-4 (Supp. 1970).
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Notwithstanding our above recommendation, we would suggest
that the North Dakota legislature study the legislation of those states
which have attempted to give creditor's some protection while at the
same time preserving the joint tenancy estate. The statutes of each
of these states, as mentioned, has a slightly different approach, and
a combination or modification of any or all of these statutes may be
necessary to best serve North Dakota's needs.
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